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This study examines the United States (U.S.) Maritime
Industry as a potential defense force, its present defense
capabilities and the government programs and legislation
designed to support it. The current government subsidy pro-
gram is determined to be inadequately structured to meet the
nation's need for a merchant marine of modern, efficient and
competitive vessels. Defense mobility has also declined as
a result of ineffective programs. Included is a brief history
of the Merchant Marine and its commercial and national defense
objectives. The analysis discusses the criteria for selecting
a viable ship design to fulfill the U.S. Merchant Marine
requirements for commercial and defense missions. Conclusions
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I. INTRODUCTION
The capability of the United States (U.S.) Merchant Marine
tc adequately fulfill its objectives of carrying a substantial
portion of waterborne foreign commerce and serving as a mili-
tary auxiliary for national defense is currently open to
question. Doubt exists because of the erratic history of the
Merchant Marine throughout past periods of conflict, when mas-
sive shipbuilding efforts had to be undertaken in order to
provide adequate shipping.
Since World War (VJW) II, the decline of the U.S. flag mer-
chant fleet has indicated that too little usable shipping
capacity exists to directly support the U.S. defense effort or
to carry any significant portion of world trade. Only after
the crisis situations of the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts
did the U.S. marshal its capacities and construct the neces-
sary tonnage to support the fighting forces. The potential for
history to repeat itself exists today.
Massive government subsidy programs, as they currently
exist, have not turned the tide for the U.S. flag fleet.
Today's U.S. Merchant Marine plays only a minor role in inter-
national oceanborne commerce, carrying less than five percent
of U.S. foreign trade in 1979 [1:33]. This means that the U.S.
must depend on foreign ships to carry ninety-five percent of
American imports and exports. This reflects the relatively

small size and capacity of the fleet as compared to those of
other countries.
Relatively few ships under U.S. registry today have the
genuine capability to meet military needs. Containerships
,
with rare exceptions, are not equipped with cranes to handle
their cargoes. Their military usefulness depends upon the
availability of adequate cranes at the objective area, or heli-
copters able to lift thirty or more tons. Heavy-lift ships,
vessels with booms and winches with single lift capacity of
200 tons, are desirable to handle military equipment. Break-
bulk ships, vessels of proven value in the military support
role because they can accept the assorted and odd-shaped
impedimenta of an expeditionary force, are decreasing in
number as more and more trade routes are converted to container-
ized traffic. The military need for these ships, however,
remains. Roll-on/Roll-of f ships can accommodate large numbers
of outsize vehicles, and can deliver them to any harbor where
they can drop their stern ramps to a platform. There are,
unfortunately, very few ships of these types in the U.S. fleet.
Given its present status, of what value would the Merchant
Marine be should the U.S. be called upon to fight another war,
a war on the scale of the previous World Wars such as a Russian
invasion of Europe?
This research effort examines the defense mobility capa-
bility of the U.S. Merchant Marine and its requirement to
10

fulfill the role of a military auxiliary in time of war or
national emergency.
In this analysis, the author describes a general history
of the Merchant Marine and the various government subsidy
programs which have been infused into the industry in an
effort to achieve its stated objectives.
Following this background, a description of today's Mer-
chant Marine will be presented with facts and figures on its
relative world position. A description of the methods used by
the government in acquiring ships to augment its naval assets
is followed by a section which analyzes those ship types most
suitable for both commercial and military support applications
The last section will deal with conclusions and recommenda-
tions based on the analysis conducted.
11

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Except for periods of war, over the past century, the
United States commercial shipping industry has been in a state
of constant decline. This trend has been both in capital equip-
ment, i.e., numbers and capabilities of ship types, and in
percentage of U.S. commercial business transported. This de-
cline has been in spite of the expenditure of great sums of
money through massive subsidization programs. This depicts
the current situation of our maritime industry; some historical
background will help show how today's situation came about.
Ships and shipping suffered through growing pains in the
history of early America. For the early colonists, lumber
for shipbuilding was plentiful and trade a necessity for
survival. Costs of American-built vessels were low and grad-
ually this country became pre-eminent in the building of
wooden ships. In 1790 U.S. ships carried almost ninety per-
cent of the nation's exports and imports. By the early 1850 's
the U.S. Merchant fleet was rapidly overtaking that of Great
Britain, traditionally the world's dominant sea power. How-
ever, when steamships were invented in the early part of the
nineteenth century, America declined to take expeditious ad-
vantage of such vessels, leaving an open invitation to the
British to develop them. Instead, America dedicated time
12

and money to the wooden sailing ship, culminating in the design
of the fast, sleek clipper ships in the 1840 's. England, mean-
while, was investing heavily in iron steamships.
By 1860, the two main merchant fleets in the world were
those of Great Britain with 5.7 million tons and the United
States with 5.3 million tons. Until this point in U.S. history,
American flag ships had been favored by the navigation laws of
the major maritime nations and coupled with the superior carry-
ing capacity, speed and seaworthiness of American ships, our
merchant fleet was placed in a superior competitive position in
the ocean-carrying trade. However, with the replacement of
wood by iron and steel in the shipbuilding craft, U.S. flag
ships began to lose this competitive edge.
The Civil War accelerated the decline for the U.S. Merchant
Marine. To avoid losing any further ships in the war effort,
large numbers were transferred to foreign registry with the
restriction that those that were transferred would not be per-
mitted to return to U.S. registry. As much as one third of
the merchant fleet was sold outright during the four years of
the Civil War [2:57] . By 1866 only 32 percent of American trade
was carried in American ships [2:58].
America's post Civil War interests turned towards the
development of the railroads and the opening of the West.
Maritime matters received less and less attention by the
government. This resulted in the merchant fleet's decline from
a once prominent position to a level in 1914 where only nine
13

percent of the value of foreign commerce was carried in American
ships [3:18]
.
A law passed in 1817, requiring ship owners to buy only
American-made ships, heavily restricted the potential growth
of the merchant fleet [2:53]. The basic problem, which still
exists today, was that high costs associated with American
shipyards made U.S. flag ships more expensive to purchase than
their foreign counterparts. American manufactured ships were
faced with initial high fixed costs which made them less compet-
itive than those built in Europe. Coupled with high production
costs was the Seaman's Act of 1915, which directed that the
crew of U.S. merchant flagships had to be American. American
crews were traditionally more expensive than the foreign
nationals most often used on the ships of other flags.
Laws such as these, while presumably benefitting shipyards
and merchant seamen, worked to the disadvantage of the industry
as a whole since fewer ships were built. For example, the
policy to protect American shipyards from overseas competition
raised the price of ships to U.S. operators by 40 to 50 percent
[4:30]. The response of the industry was to maintain utiliza-
tion of out-dated technology so that as late as 1890 the majority
of the fleet was comprised of wooden sailing ships [4:30].
In World War I, and later in World War II, massive ship-
building efforts were undertaken. The outbreak of war in Europe
in 1914 forced foreign nations to withdraw their ships, leaving
U.S. ports overcrowded with cargo and no means of transport.
14

Congress was spurred to enact the Shipping Act of 1916 which
gave temporary authority for foreign built ships to be register-
ed in the United States for use in foreign trade. This act also
spurned a surge of ship construction, resulting in the mass
production of over 2,000 units [5:5]. As a result of this pro-
gram the American merchant fleet grew from 6 . 8 percent of the
world's total (gross tons) in 1914 to 22.2 percent in 1920
[6:19] .
At the conclusion of World War I, the United States was
confronted with the problem of disposing of the excess tonnage
in surplus government-owned ships. Two pieces of Congressional
legislation, the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1928 were
enacted in an attempt to alleviate the overcrowded harbors
following World War I. They tried to establish a definitive
policy regarding the Merchant Marine:
. . .That it is necessary for the national defense and
the proper growth of the foreign and domestic com-
merce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine of the best equipped and most suitable types
of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion
of its commerce and serve as a naval auxiliary in
time of war or national emergency . . . ultimately to
be owned and operated by citizens of the U.S. [5:5]
These two pieces of legislation are the roots of ongoing
and current subsidy programs to the shipping industry. They
established trade routes to be sold to American citizens and
directed that all U.S. Mail be carried in U.S. ships. The
1928 Act established a subsidy program for mail carriers and
the construction of a few new ships was also accomplished.
But despite its intended effects, the two acts of the 1920 's
15

could not produce the trade necessary to support the excess
ships manufactured for the war effort. Excess inventory was
sold to private citizens at reduced prices with no incentives
for innovative technology. The U.S. Merchant Marine was headed
for a point when the whole fleet would be obsolete at once.
Unless public funds were provided the merchant fleet would
shrink still further into decline.
In response to this impending disaster Congress passed the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This legislation represented a
new and costly approach to the ills of the maritime industry.
Direct subsidies were granted in the forms of construction and
operating differentials to increase the number of ships built
in American shipyards, to provide jobs and high wages for mer-
chant seamen caught in the jaws of the Depression and to ensure
a capable merchant fleet as part of the national defense
program. It also established the Maritime Commission to monitor
the subsidy program and the industry in general.
The idea of a subsidized program to the industry was the
key issue in the Merchant Marine Act of 19 36. The federal
government was now involved with direct funding of a major
portion of the costs associated with the construction and man-
ning of U.S. flag vessels.
The Construction-Differential Subsidy (CDS) involved
government funding the shipyard the difference between what the
American yard charged and what a foreign shipyard would charge.
Shipowners paid up to that amount which would be charged by a
16

foreign construction yard and the government paid the differ-
ence, within certain percentage limits. Initially, the govern-
ment paid only 33 percent. This was subsequently raised to a
50 percent limit. The 5 percent limit remained in effect
until 1960, when it was raised to 55 percent. The 1970 Merchant
Marine Act took steps to reduce this percentage differential
and in 1976 the limit was reduced to 50 percent [2:79] .
For a shipyard to be eligible to participate in the CDS
program, certain criteria have to be met:
1. The vessel constructed must be utilized in foreign
trade
;
2. Crew members on subsidized ships must be American
citizens
;
3. The Navy Department must approve construction
plans to determine the vessel's suitability for
use;
4. The vessel must be registered in the U.S. for at
least twenty-five (25) years [2:80].
In essence, the construction-differential subsidy is a
direct subsidy to the shipbuilding industry. Funds paid out
by the federal government under the CDS program in 1978
totalled $156 million. The total cost of this program from
1936 through 1978 has been over $2.8 billion in federal funds
[1:97] .
The other subsidy program which was established by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, is called the Operating-Differential
Subsidy (ODS) . The intentions of the program, as effected by
direct payments to certain shipowners/operators, was to offset
17

the difference in cost in operating an American flag ship as
opposed to a foreign flag vessel, which traditionally is much
cheaper. The amount of the ODS
:
. . . shall equal the excess of the subsidizable wage
costs of the United States officers and crews, ...
cost of insurance . . . and maintenance over the esti-
mated fair and reasonable cost of the same items
(less the cost of defense related items) if such
vessels were operated under the registry of a for-
eign country ... [2:83]
Eligible ships had to be constructed in the United States and
be efficient and competitive in foreign trade.
Approximately 85 percent of the ODS goes to wages, old-
age pensions and unemployment benefits. Insurance accounts
for about 8 percent and maintenance about 7 percent [2:84].
Federal outlays under the ODS program were over $303 million
in 1978, with a total since 1936 to $5.2 billion [1:97].
The iMerchant Marine Act of 1936 was designed to establish
a fleet which would provide vital shipping services for American
manufactured and agricultural products at comparable rates to
those offered by foreign competitors. The program proved to
be of tremendous value to the U.S. effort at the outbreak of
World War II in that it provided an impetus to the required
expansion of the shipbuilding industry. Between 1940 and 1945,
U.S. yards built 5,037 merchant vessels of 2,000 gross tons and
over [4:53]. However, once the war was over and the post-war




Excess tonnage was reduced with the passage of the Merchant
Ship Sales Act of 19 46. U.S. citizens and friendly foreign
countries, whose fleets had been drawn down during the war,
purchased the government surplus. Eight hundred and forty-
three of these vessels were transferred to American^f lag
operators and 1,113 vessels went to foreign flags, primarily
England, Noirway and France [2:91]. Those remaining, over 1800,
were retired to the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) [2:91]
The U.S. Merchant Marine fell back into a period of decline for
much of the same reasons as post World War I: not enough trade
to support worldwide fleets.
As other nation's fleets and shipbuilding industries became
more progressively larger, more productive and more competitive,
the U.S. flag fleet continued to decline to the point where by
1969, it carried only five percent of the nation's foreign trade
as compared to eleven percent in 1960 [4:73].
The Vietnam Conflict held off the forecasted shrinking of
the merchant fleet due to its internal use during the middle
to late 1960 's. A downward trend which had existed since
World War II was stalled, for a short time, due to the Vietnam
War. Table 1 shows the total number of ships of 1000 tons or
over from 1960 - 1973.
The Merchant Marine Act of 19 70 attempted to bolster both
the Merchant Marine and the shipbuilding industry. The 1970
Act reflected the change in climate which had come about in
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changed from a labor-intensive industry to a capital-inten-
sive industry. It also reflected the shift from the liner-
dominated foreign trade of 1936 to the bulk carrier-dominated
trade of the 1970 's. Approxim.ately 90 percent of the U. S.
foreign trade volume (by ton-miles) is in bulk commodities.
With regard to the shipbuilding facet, the 1970 Act
reflected the idea that U. S. yards could become more effi-
cient and competitive on a world market basis. Towards this
end, the Act called for the production of 30 new vessels
between 1971 and 1980 [2:93]. By promoting standard designs,
it sought to encourage economies of scale as the number of
ships produced increased. Shipyards were now given the op-
portunity to request the CDS funds to build ships in advance
of a firm order from a shipowner.
To preclude long delays encountered in waiting for
American production of subcomponents, the Act allowed the
Secretary of Commerce to purchase foreign built components
for ship construction. This Act, along with new subsidies,
spurred the shipbuilding industry.
While the 300 new-ship construction goal has not been
reached, approximately 17 5 ships were constructed in the
decade of the 1970's [1:31]. These new vessels replaced
older ones which were retired or sold overseas so that the
total number of ships available has not changed drastically.
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There has, however, been an increase in total tonnage avail-
able between 1973 and 1979.
B. THE MERCHANT FLEET - 19 81
Today's active private ocean going fleet is composed of
a mix of ships which, as of 1 January 1981, included 545
vessels, totaling 20.5 million deadweight tons (dwt) , as
compared to 586 ships, totaling 13 million dwt on 1 September
1973 [4:204]. The various types included in this mix are:
general cargo freighters, containerships , barge carriers
known as Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) and SeaBee ships, tankers,
roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, and liquid petroleum gas (LPG)
carriers, among others. The following breakdown applies:
VESSEL TYPE NUMBER IN 1981
Combination Pass/Cargo 5
Freighters * 103




* Includes partial containers and break bulk ships
** Oil/Bulk/ORE (OBO) Carriers
*** Full containerships, RO/RO, LASH, and SeaBee types [7:8]
22

Merchant vessels under contract in private U.S. shipyards
















A sampling of some ships constructed in 1981 includes:
1. The 41,521 dwt lighter-aboard ship EDWARD RUTLEDGE
constructed in Avondale Shipyard for Waterman Steamship Corp.
Cost, $69.8 million; CDS 40.08%.
2. The 32,100 dwt dry bulk carrier PRIDE OF TEXAS , con-
structed in Levingston Shipyard for Levingston Falcon I Corp.
Cost, $40 million; CDS 49.95%.
3. The 39,500 dwt tug barge OXY TRADER , constructed in
Avondale Shipyard for Sulvanell River Corp. Cost, $52.7 million;
CDS 49.98%.
4. The 39,50 dwt tug barge OXY PRODUCER , constructed in
Avondale Shipyard for Sulvanell River Corp. Cost $51.7 million;
CDS 49.98% [8:8] .
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1. The Maritime Administration
One of the federal agencies established by the Merchant
Marine Acts to oversee the U.S. Merchant Marine is the Maritime
Administration (MarAd) . As an agency of the U.S. Department of
Commerce since 1950, MarAd is tasked with the promotion of the
U.S. Merchant Marine and America's private shipbuilding industry.
To carry out this task, the organization provides financial
aid for both shipbuilders and ship operators alike; sponsors
research and development; promotes port development and growth;
negotiates international agreements; operates the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy in New York; and maintains the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) located in various sectors of the country
for wartime mobilization [9;1J.
The most visible aspect of MarAd' s functions relate to
the subsidies paid out annually in the interests of improving
the maritime industry in the United States. From 1973 to 1979
these payments averaged $500 million per year [1:99].
Proponents of the subsidy program advance two arguments
for their continuation. First, the impact on the balance of
payments achieved by a strong merchant marine with a competitive
edge in international trading and second, national defense [2:22]
With respect to the first argument, that subsidies are
intended to produce a competitive U.S. flag fleet, consider the
fact that today's U.S. Merchant Marine plays only a minor role
in international oceanbound commerce, carrying less than five
percent of U.S. foreign trade in 1979 [1:33]. This means that
24

the U.S. must depend on foreign ships to carry ninety-five
percent of American imports and exports. This reflects the
relatively small size and capacity of the fleet as compared to
those of other countries. Tables 2 and 3 indicate the trends
the U.S. Merchant Fleet has followed over recent years.
Of the 545 ships in the U.S. flag oceangoing fleet in
1981 approximately 226 were actively engaged in foreign commerce
with the rest involved primarily in trade along the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Gulf coasts of the U.S. [8:8].
With this insignificant impact on oceanborne foreign
commerce and subsequent minor impact on the balance of payments,
it is apparent that government subsidies have not achieved a
competitive U.S. flag fleet, although the fleet would probably
be in an even worse situation without the subsidies.
The second argument, national defense, must therefore
possess the soundest argument for public assistance to the U.S.
maritime industries. Supporters of this argument allege that
if assistance to these industries were ever terminated and
their services were lost to the nation, the security of the
United States would be gravely weakened. As the history of
the merchant fleet has indicated, this argument is as old as
the Republic. The important services rendered by these indus-
tries to the nation surely deserves to be taken seriously. It
is unquestionably more credible than the economic arguments
for maritime assistance. However, the current program of sub-
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2. Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is an independent
agency established by Congress composed of five commissioners
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The FMC carries out the following duties:
a. Regulation of services, rates, practices, and agree-
ments of common carriers by water;
b. Acceptance or rejection of rates filed by carriers;
c. Investigation of discriminatory practices;
d. Licensing of independent ocean freight forwarders; and
e. Rendering of decisions, issuing of orders, making rules
and regulations governing and affecting common carriers by
water, terminal operators, freight forwarders, and other per-
sons subject to the Commission's jurisdiction [4:83].
The FMC was established to administer the regulatory
responsibilities outlined under the Shipping Act of 1916, the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the Intercoastal Shipping Act of
1933, and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. These laws give the
FMC jurisdiction over waterborne movements betv/een the United
States and foreign countries as well as to noncontiguous ports
of the United States.
3
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Flags of Convenience -:-
To avoid the restrictions and regulations imposed by
the United States on its Merchant Marine, ship-operating firms
frequently register their ships in another country. The vessel
flies the flag of the other country and this procedure is called
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the establishment of a "flag of convenience." U.S. firms,
especially petroleum firms with large tanker fleets, own and
operate vessels under foreign flags of convenience.
The concept and practice of using "flags of convenience"
is old, dating back to the sixteenth century, when English mer-
chants used Spain as a flag of convenience to participate in
the Spanish West Indies trade. Immediately prior to World War
II, U.S. vessels were transferred to foreign registry so they
could carry supplies to Britain without violating the neutrality
pacts. The current large-scale ownership of flags of convenience
vessels came after World War II.
Flags of convenience allow ship-operators to avoid the
high labor costs associated with manning a U.S. flag vessel with
a U.S. crew, which would be required if the vessel was registered
in the U.S. Labor costs for a U.S. manned ship are more than
two and one-half times the cost of an Italian manned ship,
which are themselves thirty to fifty percent higher than certain
other countries [10:100].
Another aspect which makes the flag of convenience
attractive to operators is that with few exceptions, U.S. flag
vessels must be constructed and repaired in the U.S. American
shipyards have not been competitive in the world market, with
an American vessel sometimes costing more than twice what it




This duality of high labor costs and high construction
costs has effectively priced American vessels out of the world
market. Without government assistance the only way an American
vessel could compete in the world market, while minimizing costs
as a private industrial carrier, is to utilize a flag of
convenience
.
Table 4 lists the number of ships, gross tons and dead-
weight tons of foreign flag ships owned by U.S. companies in
1972.
A significant number of these ships owned by Americans,
but registered abroad, are legally available to the U.S. in
times of national emergency. Under the concept of "Effective
United States Control" (EUSC) , the owners of these ships enter
into agreements with MarAd to make their vessels available in
times of emergency [2:168]. As of 1977, 339 tankers, 102 bulk
carriers, and 28 liners representing over 20 million deadweight
tons, were designated as EUSC vessels [1:71]
.
While the flags of convenience represent a sizable
force, which by agreement may be used by the U.S. in crises,
in reality, much controversy has been raised over the true
availability of these vessels and the potential benefit they
"might serve. The EUSC fleet is scattered throughout the world
and, therefore, control over such ships is very decentralized
and weak. Additionally, this fleet is manned by multi-national
crews whose loyalties may be inconsistent with those of the U.S.




FOREIGN FLAG SHIPS OWNED BY UNITED STATES COMPANIES OR FOREIGN
AFFILIATES OF UNITED STATES COMPANIES INCORPORATED UNDER THE








Liberia 238 9 ,267,005 17 ,998,842
United Kingdom 109 3 ,977,188 7 ,309,869
Panama 95 2 ,062,453 3 ,622,392
France 11 695,999 1 ,324,689
Netherlands 16 621,416 1 ,088,535
Germany- 12 452,387 813,277
Spain 4 325,354 613,382
Italy 10 333,880 494,091
Norway 10 254,917 453,895
Belgium 9 188,216 299,682
Denmark 6 109,455 181,649
Venezuela 6 116,113 172,569
Canada 7 59,841 90,237
Uruguay 2 50,766 85,830
Honduras 11 56,323 52,070
Australia 1 15,000 24,000
South Africa 1 14,560 23,421
Finland 4 7,999 10,878




Also, since most EUSC ships are not subject to American
government and military inspection and not built in U.S. ship-
yards, their military value is difficult to determine at any
given time.
Cs SUMMARY
The U.S. flag merchant fleet has waxed and waned during
the course of the nation's history. In an effort to offset a
series of ineffective acts, and facing the realization that the
U.S. Merchant Marine was in need of help. Congress addressed
themselves to new and effective legislation. The result was
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which represents the founda-
tion of the present posture of the U.S. Merchant Marine.
Towards the attainment of the objectives set forth in the
act of 1936, provisions were enacted for the infusion of govern-
ment subsidies into the maritime industry. To administer these
subsidy programs and to aid the development, operation and
promotion of a strong, modern American Merchant Marine the
Maritime Administration was established.
In spite of the act of 1936, which was later amended in
1970, the attempts to bolster both the merchant marine and the
shipbuilding industry have failed to produce significant




III. THE prqbi:em of meeting objectives
A. GENERAL
In this chapter some discussion will be set forth regarding
the current problems of the U.S. Merchant Marine in meeting its
stated objective of serving as a military auxiliary for national
defense. With respect to this problem area the following items
will be discussed:
1. The procedures in acquiring segments of the merchant
fleet for wartime use;
2. The relationship of the National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in this process;
3. The most recent large military use of merchant vessels -
Vietnam;
4. And finally the intent of the subsidy program.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
The Declaration of Policy in the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 states:
"It is necessary for the national defense and development
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United
States shall have a merchant marine sufficient to carry
a substantial portion of water-borne foreign commerce
and capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency."
This passage clearly states that national defense is a
primary policy objective of the U.S. Merchant Marine.
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The U.S. Merchant Marine has been called the "Fourth Arm of
Defense," supposedly ready to integrate with the Army, Navy,
and Air Force in times of conflict to protect U.S. interests
overseas, and at the same time provide a continuing supply of
raw materials at home [12:53]
Even in this age of advanced nuclear technology, when wars
may be fought and won in hours, there are still strong possibil-
ities that conventional long-term wars will be fought. The
strategic concept of flexible response places great emphasis on
the ability of the United States to rapidly deploy combat
forces, equipment, and supplies to Europe to counter an attack
by Warsaw Pact forces or to intervene in a Middle East conflict.
The degree of required responsiveness of strategic mobility
forces is dependent on interrelated factors such as the nature
of the threat or developing conflict, the capabilities of the
enemy, and the nature of the forces to be transported. To
support these conventional efforts a strong sealift capability
is required.
1 . National Defense
Ocean transportation resources have made significant
contributions to the national security since the early days of
the Republic. These resources, and the sealift capability they
produce, have developed through a series of peaks and valleys.
Over the years U.S. military and civil sealift assets have been
subject to planned reductions after each war, and have required
extraordinary effort in order to be reconstituted to meet new
35

military requirements. While it is understandable that the
reductions in wartime shipping to levels that can be econom-
ically maintained in peacetime are necessary, it is difficult
to comprehend the logic that allows sealift capability, par-
ticularly that required for initial military responsiveness,
to fall below minimum required levels.
a. Ship Procurement/Requisitioning
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on
the merchant fleet. In order to be able to requisition these
merchant assets , the government first must determine if existing
DOD assets are sufficient to cover the requirements of the
situation. The first group of ships to be considered are those
of the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
.
The Military Sealift Command provides sea trans-
portation support on a regular basis for the Department of
Defense. Maintaining a small fleet of twenty-seven ships, six
government owned and twenty-one chartered vessels, MSC is the
initial source of sealift capability in an emergency [4:1].
The next group of ships to be called upon would be
regular civilian merchantmen through standard charter procedures
Should the MSC fleet be considered inadequate, the government
would resort to the hiring of commercial vessels, if available.
The reasoning behind this is for the U.S. to offer business to
its own merchant fleet in order to support it before calling




The NDRF is a fleet of 317 ships stored in three
locations around the country for use in contingency situations.
They are located in James River, Virginia (157 ships); Beaumont,
Texas (49 ships); and Suisun Bay, California (111 ships) [1:80].
Table 5 shows the history of the NDRF since 1945.
Although these ships do exist their number has gen-
erally been decreasing over the years primarily due to the sale,
for scrap, of the W'? II vintage members of the fleet. This
has resulted in speculation that the NDRF, the bulk of which is
over twenty-five years old, is inadequate in today's environment
to be of much utility. One reason for this is the age of these
ships; the technology is old and not many seamen are around with
the knowledge to operate these ships. If these personnel are
available, they are most likely already gainfully employed and
difficult to obtain for this purpose.
These manpower deficiencies were illustrated when
these ships were returned to service in support of the Vietnam
war. There were shortages of skilled marine engineers and deck
officers. As a result, in 1969, 135 NDRF sailings experienced
a cumulative delay of 649 days or 4.8 days per ship. In 1967
and 1968 there were a total of 201 delayed sailings for an
average of 3.4 or 4.8 days per ship [13:12] . v . ^ _. -'
In 197 5 MarAd initiated a new concept called the
Ready Reserve Force (RRF). . This program was to provide a sea-
lift capability of approximately 340,000 measurement tons (Mts)
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activation within five to ten days for deployment during
emergencies [1:77]. This time frame is far shorter than the
21-45 day window given for the regular NDRF , which is apparently
optimistic given prior experience.
However , in order to break ships out of the National
Defense Reserve Fleet, several decisions have to be made involv-
ing DOD, the Navy, and the Department of Commerce. The Mer-
chant Ship Sales Act of 1946 provides the authority to withdraw
ships from the NDRF but only if the threat to requisition com-
mercial shipping exists:
A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no case be used
for any purpose whatsoever except that any such vessel
may be used for account of any agency or department of
the United States during any period in which vessels may
be requisitioned under section 902 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936. [14:93]
.
As stated, this means that activation cannot take
place unless requisitioning appears imminent. The principle
behind this is that commercial shippers want all the govern-
ment business they can handle. Since the U.S. maritime indus-
try has a poor competitive position in world trade, it looks
to the government for business on a regular basis. Thus, the
industry desires to be fully utilized before allowing more
ships to be pushed into the pool.
The government has adhered to policies geared to
keep the merchant ships busy. A public law passed in 1954, and
still in force today, requires that fifty percent of all govern-





Furtheirmore , a document called the Wilson-Weeks
Agreement, signed in 1954, between Secretary of Defense Charles
E. Wilson and Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks, has as one
of its purposes to prioritize the acquisition of sea assets and
services. While recognizing the MSC controlled fleet, it also
sought to protect commercial business. In essence it dictates
that the U.S. government will make full use of merchant fleet
assets before calling out the NDRF or resorting to foreign
vessels
.
2 . Merchant Marine Involvement in Vietnam
The importance of strategic mobility and military re-
supply with regard to the U.S. Merchant fleet was demonstrated
in the Vietnam crisis. Some ninety-eight percent of the mili-
tary cargoes to Vietnam were carried by ship [2:92] . During
the three primary buildup years of the Vietnamese conflict,
1965 - 1968, 172 NDRF ships transported in excess of 6,800,000
tons or twenty-eight percent of all military cargo shipped to
Southeast Asia. MSC ships carried 1,700,000 tons or seven
percent. Commercial ships carried 15,400,000 tons or sixty-five
percent [13:6-10]
.
e. SUBSIDIES - WHAT IS THE INTENT?
Towards the achievement of the objectives of the Merchant
Marine, stated at the beginning of the chapter, the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 provided for subsidies to be granted to
ship-operators, in the form of the Operating Differential
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Subsidy CODS) and to shipyards, in the form of Construction
Differential Subsidies CCDS)
.
Subsidies shall be defined here as monetary assistance
granted by a government to a person or a private commercial
enterprise. Note that the definition does not state the pur-
pose of the grant. The difficulty in which the U.S. Merchant
Marine finds itself today seems to stem from a similar lack of
statement of purpose in our national policy.
What purpose justifies channeling funds from the federal
treasury to the privately owned, profit-seeking U.S. maritime
industry? If it is to fulfill a valid purpose, then every
effort must be advanced to achieve it.
In international shipping there is a marked disparity in
costs between the ships serving a trade route. Survival and
the attainment of a high cost modern fleet is made possible
only by the infusion of government funds. The purpose of this
infusion should be expressed clearly as support of a merchant
marine which is aggressive, competitive, and able to carry a
significant share of the available commercial cargo.
A collateral purpose of the subsidy is to assure that ships
operated with government aid are designed, built, and maintained
so that they require a minimum of conversion if requisitioned
for military use.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, while it is the cornerstone
of the subsidy program, has some major shortfalls regarding the
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attainment of these objectives. Since the Merchant Marine Act
of 1970 contained only minor modifications, shortfalls still
exist.
First, the stipulations concerning the portion of ship-
building costs to be paid for by the government, i.e., fifty
percent, are restrictive in that they do not equalize U.S. and
foreign costs. This subsidy is computed on the total cost of
construction with no allowance for the disadvantage the ship-
owner incurs by paying higher annual amortization and interest
charges than his foreign competitor.
Second, there are no provisions to encourage greater effi-
ciency and more effective employment of the merchant fleet.
Third, the acts contain only the generalized statement
that vessels built with construction differential subsidies
shall be for economical and speedy conversion into military
auxiliaries.
When the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was written it centered
on developing the mechanics of a system to subsidize the U.S.
merchant fleet. The purpose of the subsidy program was omitted,
although the objectives of the Merchant Marine are clear.
The U.S., as a major marketplace of the world, attracts to
its ports the ships of every maritime nation. Rivalry among
these carriers for the favor of U.S. commerce is intense, and
is evident in their employment of the most modern snips and the
most innovative techniques of operation. Importers and exporters
do not patronize inferior or obsolescent ships; they choose
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ships which give the best results at the lowest cost regardless
of nationality. United States shipowners, therefore, must be
in the position to respond quickly to challenges, especially
when new ships are placed in service by foreign competition.
Currently, the Acts specify that the amount of subsidy for
new construction shall be the difference between the cost of
building the ship in a U.S. yard and building that same ship,
to the U.S. specifications, in a foreign shipyard, but in no
event shall the subsidy exceed fifty percent of the U.S. cost.
This provision creates an obstacle to achieving the purpose of
establishing and maintaining a modern merchant fleet.
For example, the requirements of those U.S. agencies which
supervise shipbuilding are higher and more inflexible than those
of many other maritime nations. It is unrealistic to expect,
as the 19 36 Act does, that a foreign corporation would build a
ship to meet U.S. standards and thereby increase its costs.
United States shipowners point this out in their complaint that
the limitations on construction differential subsidy deny them
full parity with foreign ship builders.
There is also keen competition among the world's shipbuilders,
and unexpected low prices might be obtained by systematic canvas-
sing of qualified yards. This cannot be done under the U.S.
system. The Maritime Administration makes every effort to deter-
mine accurately what the lowest foreign building cost may be,
but its procedures are only estimates made in Washington, D.C.
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These are very different from evaluations of request for pro-
posals from competing yards to build one or more ships in con-
formity with carefully prepared plans and specifications.
United States shipowners reinforce their plea for genuine parity
in ship acquisition costs by referring to the fact that con-
struction subsidy awards are predicated upon these theoretical
calculations
.
The search for ways and means to increase efficiency of
men and machines has been a crusade on the part of U.S. business
for generations. The Merchant iMarine Acts, however, contain no
provisions for encouraging greater efficiency in the management
and use of the merchant fleet, nor does it reward superior
achievement.
The third, and from the military viewpoint, most critical
deficiency in the act lies in the failure to specify the purpose
of incorporating national defense features in ships built with
construction subsidies. Two lessons emerge from history. One
is that it is possible to develop a single design which fits
the ship to the needs of commerce and many of the major require-
ments of the Navy. The example of the twelve ships of the
CIMARRON class should not be forgotten. These tankers were
built by the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in 1938. The
company's architects collaborated closely with the design
teams of the Navy Department and the original Maritime Commis-
sion Cnow MarAd) , and embodied at government expense many
desirable - and as they later proved, vital - national defense
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features. The result was extolled as the finest commercial
tanker built in the United States up to that time [16:31].
All 12 of the C IMARRON class were absorbed into the Navy; eight
were converted into fleet oilers and four became small aircraft
carriers
.
The other lesson is that national defense features must not
become a means by which the government absorbs more than the
statutory limit of one-half the U.S. building cost. When the
UNITED STATES was under construction during 1950 - 52, many
"cost adjustments" in the government's share were made to keep
the price within the amount the operator was willing to pay for
the ship. Because the "Big U" was never used by the Department
of Defense, there is still no answer to the question whether
the "adjustments" served the national interest. What is ob-
vious, however, is that the purpose of national defense features
must be so clearly set forth in the statute that there is no
room for either questionable "adjustments" or excuses for ignor-
ing the requirements in future construction.
Relatively few ships under U.S. registry today have the
genuine capability to meet military needs [16:31]. These
vessels were designed to meet commercial requirements. When
the plans for new ship construction were completed, the Navy
inspected them and made recommendations as to the national
defense features desired. The lesson of the CIMARRON class
tankers appears to have been overlooked or forgotten, possibly
because the purpose of the national defense features is not
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set forth in positive terms in the act. If the full potential
of the U.S. Merchant Marine as a military auxiliary is to be
realized, those features of design and construction which have
only military value must be incorporated in the design by joint
action of naval architects representing the owners, the Mari-
time Administration, and the Navy.
D. SUMMARY
In order to achieve the objectives of the U.S. Merchant
Marine, which are to carry a substantial portion of ocean borne
foreign commerce and to be capable of serving as a naval and
military auxiliary in a national emergency, the government
infuses monetary assistance into the maritim.e industries in the
form of subsidies. In that, neither of these objectives are
being attained subsidies are being condemned on the grounds
that they insulate the beneficiary from competitive pressures,
reduce the need to be aggressive in the pursuit of business,
and discount efficiency in performance [16:31].
The fact remains that by offering a reward for increased
efficiency in management and operation, the incentive is estab-
lished to be aggressive in seeking new ways to meet the com-«
mercial objective. By making it possible for U.S. shipowners
to acquire ships built in U.S. shipyards, to U.S. standards and
specifications, but sold at prices which grant true parity with
foreign shipowners, fair costs, competition on even terms, and
aggressive performance can be demanded. By stipulating the
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underlying purpose of installing national defense features in
ships, the potential role of the merchant marine as a military
auxiliary in time of war or national emergency can become more
significant and of greater value.
Based on the above discussion the next chapter will analyze
ship types which are deemed most suitable in fulfilling the
combined objectives of the Merchant Marine.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SHIP TYPES MOST SUITABLE FOR
MEETING MERCHANT MARINE OBJECTIVES
A. GENERAL
Considering the sharply reduced funding for construction
subsidies, the high cost of an American built ship, and the
decline in the number of oceangoing merchant vessels, it is
apparent that the U. S. Merchant Marine shipbuilding pro-
gram should be revitalized. The U. S. must improve and modern-
ize the merchant marine to develop a formidable strategic
military support force and to provide a general cargo fleet
capable of competing in world trade, a task already accomplished
by the Soviets.
The Reagan Administration has announced a program to rebuild
the U. S. merchant fleet. The proposed program involves in-
creased new merchant ship construction. Since the Department
of Defense (DOD) makes extensive use of the U. S. Flag merchant
shipping to fulfill the bulk of its sealift needs and with the
advent of a major new maritime shipbuilding program, the follow-
ing analysis is intended to evaluate those ship types most suit-
able for DOD utilization. The analysis will investigate both
the capability of the vessel to support wartime defense missions
and its commercial utility.
The following ships are considered in selecting the ship
type most suitable for the U. S. Merchant Marine to operate for
commercial applications and wartime defense support missions:
48

a. Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ship
b. Containership
c. Combination RO/RO-Containership (Multi-Purpose Mobiliza-
tion Ship)
B. ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF (RO/RO) SHIP
The conventional RO/RO ship has the capability to move
wheeled military equipment, fully operational and loaded with
divisional equipment. This capability makes the RO/RO ship
valuable to military planners. Its design evolved from the
needs of the Armed Forces in World War II when transporting
vehicles and permitting vehicles to be loaded and discharged
under their own power became a requirement. The Landing Ship
Docks (LSD) and Landing Ship Tank (LST) were developed to allow
tanks, guns, and vehicles to be loaded under their own power
and, when in the area of operation, to deploy immediately over
the beaches.
1 . Concept
The fundamental concept used by the RO/RO ship is that
cargo is moved into or out of the ship without recourse to the
conventional cargo handling systems of booms and cranes. Cargo
is loaded into the ship by means of stern and/or side ramps and
moved into position within the ship by internal ramps. These
ramps can be an integral part of the ship or may be carried by
the ship. Signal systems and traffic flow patterns within the
ship are used to avoid congestion and to route the vehicles to
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their assigned locations in the fastest manner possible.




The greatest assets attributed to the RO/RO ship are
the flexibility in the types and size of cargo that can be car-
ried and the rapidness by which this cargo can be loaded and
discharged. The resultant reduced port time increases the
utilization factor of the ship and enables the operator to accrue
more productive days per year and thereby decrease cost.
Commercial carriers in their advertising stress that
this ship can carry any combination of different sized trailers
or containers on chassis, or any cargo as long as it can move
onto and off the ship on wheels.
Military planners view the RO/RO ship as desirable in
that it has the capability of using the normal wharves and piers
available for port loading and unloading operations. This capa-
bility opens the use of many ports which are closed to most of
the containerships because of the requirements for extensive
shoreside discharge/loading equipment.
3 Disadvantages
The RO/RO concept has made only slight inroads into
the shipping industry. It is a viable means of eliminating
the costly and time consuming break-bulk operations, and it
furnishes the flexibility to the shipper of hauling oversized
cargo. However, a major disadvantage is the loss of a large
percentage of the gross cargo capability because of the
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broken stowage caused by the vehicles wheels and undercarriage.
A study was conducted on comparative ship types for handling
general cargo and the findings indicated only 40 percent of the
total volume of the cargo capacity of the RO/RO was utilized
because of broken stowage. [17:695-699]
General cargo without wheels must be handled only by
palletizing it and utilizing forklift trucks. These forklifts
cannot however climb the normal ramps on board a ship of this
type. Therefore, lift-on/lift-off equipment, either shore or
deck cranes, booms, etc. are required.
The RO/RO, because of its speed in discharging and load-
ing does require special terminal facilities. The shoreside
facilities must have a good network of highways branching out
and a sizeable marshalling area for incoming and outgoing
vehicles
.
The requirement for these facilities must be viewed in
light of the concept of utilization for RO/RO ' s in contingency
plans. In many foreign areas port and terminal facilities have
not kept pace with the rapid development of the new ships in
the fleet and in many cases the procedures and practices used
in cargo handling are no further advanced than they were at the
beginning of the twentieth century. The problem in utilizing
underdeveloped ports for the RO/RO would be that discharge
rates would be slowed because of congestion in the port facility
and some loss of cargo space on the main deck, if side port





The design characteristics of the basic RO/RO ' s in
service at present are similar to those presented in table 6.
Table 6





Cargo Capacity: 160,000 square feet
[18:77]
5 Construction and Operation Costs
Construction and operation costs for the RO/RO ship are
presented in table 7. Costs are in 1980 dollars.
C. CONTAINERSHIP
Since the mid-1960 's, the principal vessel employed in the
carriage of general cargo has been the containership [19:99].
The U. S. Armed Forces first used containers for shipping
valuable and pilferable military cargoes during World War I.
Containerization on the North Atlantic began with the Scotch
whiskey trade between Glasgow and the United States. The con-
tainers were stuffed with cases of Scotch at the exporters
'
warehouses, sealed for transit, and emptied at the importers'
warehouses. The entire investment of substituting a high-




CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIO'J COSTS FOR THE RO/RO VESSEL
(1980 Dollars)
a. Construction Costs per vessel $ 90,000,000.00
b. Operating Expenses (based on a 90% utilization






Stores, Supplies & Effects (S.S.&E.) 164,000.00




70% ODS - 2,451,000. 00











Cargo Handling Costs 367,000.00
Other Port Expenses 1,000. 00
Total Annual U.S. Voyage Costs $ 630,000.00
Total Annual Foreign Voyage Costs 722, 000. 00




high-labor, low-capital cost system of break-bulk cargoes was
justified by the reduction in pilferage of cases of Scotch
handled as break-bulk cargo on the U. S. waterfront. Except
for a hijacked container or two, the savings from reduced
"inventory shrinkage" economically sustained the start of the
transformation of the international trade of goods from break-
bulk to containerized cargoes
.
Since the traditional wharves and warehouse terminals for
break-bulk cargoes were not designed to handle large numbers
of containers, specialized container terminals were built on




Like ships, barges, railroad cars, motor freight trailers
and mounted truck bodies, containers may be modified to allow
carriage of nearly any type of transportable commodity. Most
specialized containers are adaptations of the standard general
purpose cargo containers which serve as the mainstays of the
industry. A general purpose container is eight feet high, eight
feet wide and twenty, thirty, or forty feet long. It is per-
manently enclosed on three sides, the top and the bottom with
a set of double doors for loading at one end. The standard
container is capable of carrying a load of dry cargo which is
not heat sensitive and which will weigh, in combination, no
more than thirty tons, the maximum weight which most container
handling cranes are able to accommodate. General purpose
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containers are constructed from three basic types of materials:
steel, aluminum, or fiberglass-reinforced, plastic-laminated
plywood. The choice of construction material, or combination
of materials, must be based on the requirements of the user,
the necessary amount of protection from weather and pilferage
and the expected useful life of the unit.
Containerized vessels are cellular in nature with instal-
led angle bars to guide the loaded container into its proper
position and hold it in place laterally and longitudinally.
Most fully containerized vessels are capable of carrying stacks
of six containers in their highest hold, with the number decreas-
ing toward the extremes and in the areas of machinery and other
mounted shipboard equipment. In addition to the boxes which
can be loaded into the hulls, container vessels are capable of
compensating for the loss of internal space by loading the
weather decks with stacks of secured containers which may be
three or four high.
An automatic ballast and list equalizing system is a
innovation which allows loading and discharge of containers to
proceed at a rapid rate during the ship's port call. Water
ballast is either added or removed from tanks in the sidewall
structure of the ship to compensate for the container load in
any configuration. During periods of time when the ship is
underway, the sidewall and double bottom ballast tanks and
mounted stabilizers maintain the stability based on the load,
the sea state and the speed and direction of the ship. In
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newer ships, adjustments may be made automatically in response




Large shore-based ship-to-shore cranes serve the needs
of many container vessels rather than requiring each vessel to
be geared or self-sustaining with onboard crane facilities.
Coupled with the increased cargo volume achieved by loading
the weather decks with stacks of containers, the speed with
which containerships can be loaded and unloaded accounts for
its greatest commercial advantage. Containerization has brought
a revolution to the commercial shipping industry by allowing
in port turn-around-time to be approximately 24 hours. [19:94].
This kind of efficiency means a ship can spend nearly all its
time at what it was built for — hauling cargo.
3 Disadvantages
Containerships lack the flexibility to carry out-sized
cargo. With rare exceptions these ships are not equipped with
cranes to handle their cargoes. Their military usefulness
depends upon availability of adequate cranes at the objective
area, or helicopters able to lift thirty or more tons. Heavy-
lift ships — vessels with booms and winches with single-lift
capacity of 200 tons — are desirable to handle military
equipment. There are two of these ships, each of about 2,700
deadweight ton capacity under the U.S. flag. Break-bulk ships,
which are vessels of proven value in the military support role
because they can accept the assorted and odd-shaped impediments
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of an expeditionary force, are decreasing in number as more




The design characteristics of the typical containership
in service at the present are similar to those presented in
table 8.
Table 8
Design Characteristics of Containership
Length: 650-700 feet
Beam: 90 feet
NbR boxes carried: 1500-2000
Speed: 20-25 knots
Cargo Capacity: 30-35,000 tons
[18:96] .
5 Construction and Operation Costs
Construction and operation costs for the containership
are presented in table 9. Costs are in 1980 dollars.
D. COMBINATION (MULTI-PURPOSE MOBILIZATION SHIP)
One of the specific functions of the Maritime Administration
is to provide shipping capability during declared national
emergencies and full-scale wartime mobilization, when massive
movements of military supplies may be needed. As a step in ful-
filling this need, MarAd has developed a "mobilization ship
design" that can be mass-produced during wartime. The objec-




CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION COSTS FOR CONTAINERSHIP
(1980 Dollars)
Construction and Operation Costs
a. Construction Costs per Vessel $ 54,277,000.00

























Total Annual U.S. Voyage Costs $ 675,000.00
Total Annual Foreign Voyage Costs 957,000.00

















capacity needed during long-term conflicts in addition to provid-
ing a feasible ship type for commercial applications.
1. Concept
The multi-purpose mobilization ship offers the capa-
bility of efficient stowage of standard twenty and forty feet
containers. Alternatively, it also is capable of carrying
generalized outsized cargo via the lift-on/lift-off mode of
cargo handling using the ship's installed gear and cranes. A
sizeable amount of roll-on/roll-off cargo can also be
accommodated. Several options of the ship type have been
developed including: the addition of a cargo midbody, installa-
tion of a variety of machinery plants, an option with gantry
cranes, and an option with emphasis on stowing roll-on/roll-off
cargo
.
This vessel, although not in operation or under con-
struction has completed various phases of development by MarAd.
The first phase has resulted in the development of working
papers which reviewed needed shipping capabilities, shipyard
production problems, engineering system alternatives and pos-
sible ship concepts and design constraints. It was recognized
during this phase that a variety of vessel types and sizes
would be required for commercial -acceptance on various trade
routes
.
The second phase has also been completed. It began
with the development of three conceptual designs;
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a. the "5 00 General" which featured a 4 89 foot length
between perpendiculars (LBP) and 73.5 foot beam vessel with five
general cargo holds
.
b. the "670 RO/RO" which had a 655 foot LBP and 105
foot beam and was designed primarily for roll-on/roll-off cargo.
c. the "550 Combination" which had 560 feet LBP and
97 foot beam. This vessel featured the multi-purpose cargo
handling approach. Eight cargo holds were serviced by cranes
with hatch covers forming a container guide structure, which
when in a vertical position, allows the easy loading of
containers. A stern ramp also provided for roll-on/roll-off
cargo access to the second deck.
These designs have been reviewed by MarAd with com-
mercial inputs, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV) , Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , Military Sealift
Command (MSC) , the U.S. Army, and others. Of the three con-
cept designs, the "550 Combination" received strong preference
as the building block of the mobilization fleet because it is
a general cargo/roll-on, roll-off container design [20].
2 . Advantages
The "550 Combination" is well suited for commercial
operation to developing countries in that it is capable of being
converted to more sophisticated containerized operations as the
trading area's capabilities increase.
As previously mentioned, it was determined that the
primary military mission would be the resupply of equipment
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and consumables necessary in a massive ground war, generally
to developed ports that may or may not have shoreside cargo
handling equipment usable. These considerations dictate a
ship with self-contained cargo handling capabilities. Military
considerations also lend to a requirement for redundancy in
cargo handling, i.e., access to holds by different cranes or
both RO/RO and lift-on/lift-off access.
To meet a wide variety of possible but uncertain
requirements the key is a combination of the concepts of flexi-
bility and versatility. Flexibility, the quality of being
adjustable to change or being capable of modification, and
versatility, the quality of being competent in many things or
able to turn easily from one occupation to another, are prime
considerations in the "550 Combination" design effort.
3 . Disadvantages
It is often suggested, based on the thought one cannot
be all things to all people or users, that the concept of a
combination ship is of dubious utility because it has no
clearly defined role. It should be emphasized from the outset
that this ship is not intended to do everything. It is how-
ever designed to be flexible enough to meet the varying require-
ments on many trade routes and flexible enough to change with
the trades as those trade routes develop. Initially however,
the combination ship is best suited for trade on those routes




4 . Design Characteristics
The original preliminary design characteristics of the
Iti-purpose mobilization ship are presented in table 10.
5. Construction and Operation Costs
Construction and operation costs for the multi-purpose
mobilization ship are presented in table 11. Costs are in
1980 dollars.
E. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A comparative economic analysis of the three proposed ship
types was made by the Department of Commerce in 1978, in order
to obtain a perspective of the commercial and wartime defense
support viability of each [22:30]
1. Combination (Multi-Purpose Mobilization Ship)
Required freight rates, the commercial freight rates
required for the transport of goods, were calculated for a
variety of loading conditions and utilization rates in order
to determine the sensitivity of the mobilization ship to chang-
ing market conditions. As a ship which is expected to operate
on a developing trade route, its commercial success may well
depend on its ability to be competititve in varying market
conditions
.
A key portion of the analysis was a comparison of the
change in the required freight rates (RFR) for varying market
conditions. To simplify the analysis, the RFRs were calculated




DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MULTI-PURPOSE MOBILIZATION SHIP
Length Overall FT 609
Beam (Molded) FT 97
Capacities (Maximum)
a. Total Volume in Holds (Molded)* FT^
3
b. Bale Cubic on Holds* FT
3
c. Liquid Cargo (Permanent) (Molded) FT
d. Liquid Cargo (Optional) (Molded) FT
e. RO/RO Deck Area (Total)* FT^
2(Permanent) * FT
(Portable (autos) ) *FT
f. Containers (Total)* TEU
On Deck (20x8xvarious) *TEU
Below Deck (20x8x8^5) TEU
Speed at Design Draft (Steam)
a. Trial KNOTS 21.5
b. Service KNOTS 20.7
Speed at Ballast Draft (Steam)
a. Trial KNOTS 22.5
b. Service KNOTS 21.2
* These capacities are not mutually exclusive. RO/RO deck















CONSTRUCTION AI^JD OPERATION COSTS FOR
THE MULTI-PURPOSE MOBILIZATION SHIP
a. Construction Costs per Vessel $ 85,000,000.00

























Total Annual U.S. Voyage Costs
Total Annual Foreign Voyage Costs



















Operating Differential Subsidy was assumed at seventy per-
cent of the vessel operating expenses (V.O.E.) and construction
Differential Subsidy was taken at fifty percent of the construc-
tion cost.
This analysis assumed a round trip distance of 12,000
miles with two U.S. ports and three foreign ports, with an
open sea speed of twenty knots and a crew of thirty-four.
Containers were assumed to weigh twenty-four long tons per
forty foot equivalent, with the non-containerized cargo an
equal mix of break-bulk and RO/RO Cargo. A backhaul cargo
equal to that of the outgoing and of the same cargo mix was
assumed.
Required Freight Rates were calculated for utilization
rates of fifty, seventy, and ninety percent and for ten, sixty
and 100 percent of cargo in containers, for a total of nine
conditions. All costs were for a ship operating in 1980.
Operating expenses are presented in Table 12. The construc-
tion cost of the ship were amortized over twenty-five years at
eight percent per year with an assumed salvage value of seven-
teen percent of the construction cost (Capital Recovery Factor =
.0937) [22:30]. A summary of comparison ship operating
expenses is presented in Table 13.
The results are presented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 as
a non-dimensional RFR versus percent utilization and percent
cargo in containers. Each of the nine calculated RFR's were
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REQUIRED FREIGHT RATE (RPR) VERSUS PERCENT UTILIZATION
2Q 4Q 50 30 1 00
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FIGURE 3
REQUIRED FREIGHT RATE (RFR) ^/ERSUS PERCENT CARGO IN CONTAINERS
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in containers and seventy percent utilization, in order to
simplify comparison between the cases. The RFR drops as the
utilization becomes higher and as the percent cargo in con-
tainers increases. For the sixty percent cargo in containers
case, the RFR drops from 1.27 for fifty percent utilization to
0.89 for ninety percent utilization. It is noteworthy that it
would be more profitable to carry all containers at a lower
utilization rate, fifty or seventy percent, than all break
bulk cargo at a higher utilization rate, seventy or ninety
percent.
2. Containership
The containership is slightly smaller than the mobiliza-
tion ship and operates at the same design speed. It was
assumed to be operating on a full container service and since
the ship lacks cargo handling capability, shore-side cargo
handling gear was assumed. A full container ship, operating
in a container trade, has lower RFR's than the combination
multi-purpose ship, ranging from fifteen to twenty percent less
depending on the utilization factor. This difference is due
to the higher capital costs of the mobilization ship, which
includes cargo handling gear the containership does not have.
This lack of cargo handling gear is also a major disadvantage
for strategic mobility in defense missions.
3. Roll-on/Roll-off
The Ro/Ro ship is somewhat larger than the combination
mobilization ship and operates at a design speed of twenty-three
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knots compared to the mobilization ship's design speed of
twenty knots. It was assiimed to carry fifty percent of its
cargo in containers. Since the Ro/Ro is primarily designed
for Ro/Ro cargo, most of the containers were assumed to be
carried on by fork lifts with resultant longer cargo handling
times. The Ro/Ro ship has RFR's about seventeen percent lower
than the combination ship throughout the range of utilization
rates examined. Factors contributing to these lower RFR's
include the fact that the Ro/Ro is a larger ship than the com-
bination ship though the capital costs for the Ro/Ro are about
the same, again due to the less sophisticated cargo handling
equipment.
F. SUMMARY
The comparative analysis indicates that while the mobiliza-
tion ship is not as economically desirable as a specialized
ship operating on a specialized trade route it is an attractive
alternative for operating on a trade route to developing
countries. The versatility of the vessel is perhaps its most
important feature, both from a commercial and mobilization
standpoint.
In order to meet the combined objectives of the U. S.
Merchant Marine the versatility of the multi-purpose mobiliza-
tion ship is most desirable. Its design and options provide
the flexibility of efficiently handling and stowing container-
ized, roll-on/roll-off, heavy lift, and general cargo. This
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flexibility is necessary due to the uncertainty of a particular
cargo mix in a mobilization situation. The cost is high be-
cause the design must meet present day as well as future mili-
tary wartime contingencies and commercial requirements.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMT^ENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
I
As indicated in the previous chapters, problems do exist
concerning the commercial success and national defense require-
ments of the U. S. Merchant Marine. The discussion of those
particular problems leads to the conclusions and recommenda-
tions that follows.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There is a need for a strong merchant marine not only for
the reliable transportation of American commerce, but also for
utilization in military support roles in time of national
emergency. With the United States (U.S.) carrying less than
five percent of its own materials in its own ships, it could
be potentially very dangerous in time of emergency if the U.S.
had to depend on other countries to continue to transport U.S.
goods as they do now.
Additionally, since the U.S. does not have a reputation
for stockpiling raw materials, import missions bringing in such
raw materials as oil and a variety of metals necessary to sup-
port wartime production levels would likely increase. These
increases would strain the merchant fleet and add to the
competition for available vessels with military planners.
While the Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled fleet
and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) could be called
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upon, in all out war requiring immediate response, these two
fleets would be inadequate. The NDRF would be inadequate due
to time delays in activation and manpower shortages once on
line, and the MSC fleet because of its small size. Consequently,
the U.S. merchant fleet would have to be called upon.
It is uncertain just how many ships would be available in
the inventory to adequately cover contingencies currently con-
fronting the U.S. and its allies, such as an invasion of Europe
by the Warsaw Pact countries or a requirement to intervene in
a Middle East conflict.
With current U.S. commitments around the globe, a fleet of
545 ships carrying less than five percent of U.S. commerce
cannot be considered as a potent force in a total mobilization
situation.
As for ships in current construction programs, too little
is being spent to prepare them for defense contingencies. A
$35 million ship constructed under subsidy may get a $50 thou-
sand defense package which usually means some deck strengthening
to accommodate a crane or non-self sustaining container ships,
or a small landing platform for helicopters. These measures
are considered token when compared to the early 1960 's when
defense features included nuclear water washdown systems,
extra generators and weapons platforms [23:227]. Since that
time shipowners have resisted the installation of equipment
of potential use by the military, which exceed commercial
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requirements, even when the initial cost is absorbed completely
by the government because the expense of operating and main-
taining such equipment is not included in the operating dif-
ferential subsidy.
Preparedness for war is an expensive matter. Ships well
adapted to serve as military auxiliaries might never be called
upon to perform in that role. Should the need arise, however,
the fact that the ship has all the equipment installed and in
use could save much time and effort, as well as the problem of
procurement on an emergency basis.
Lacking a specific statement in the Merchant Marine Acts
of 1936 and 1970 concerning the purpose of including national
defense features in the design of ships built under subsidy,
the resistance of owners for their inclusion has met with
sympathetic acceptance by both the Department of Defense and
the Maritime Administration. The initiative in the design of
ships has been left to the merchant marine industry. Only
after the design is completed does the Navy have the privilege
of studying the plans and specifications. By that time the
opportunity to incorporate major defense applications has been
lost. The result has been that less and less has been demanded
and the commercial orientation has completely overshadowed the
national defense requirements.
Further indications of the disparity among goals between
various merchant marine related factions can be seen in this




. the failure of the current maritime program to pro-
vide an adequate and well balanced U.S. flag fleet is
attributable to the fact that the commercial market
for U.S. flag ships has generated a fleet inadequate
for national security needs. For instance our bulk
fleet can carry only a small fraction of essential
U.S. imports and the liner fleet has only a small
number of the roll-on/roll-off ships which are the
most desirable for support of military deployments
[23:200]
.
In summary the following conclusions may be drawn from the
study presented:
1. The United States needs a strong, capable merchant fleet
which at present does not exist in those terms;
2. The NDRF and the MSC controlled fleets are inadequate to
handle the quick surge force in shipping occasioned by
mobilization;
3. Current subsidy programs are not designed to accomplish
their intended purpose;
4. In spite of government assistance the U.S. Merchant Marine
is not a major carrier in international trade;
5. The national defense and security of this country require
the maintenance of strong U.S. flag merchant marine and
shipyard industries;
6. The current merchant fleet inventory of ships is not de-
signed to support military re-supply operations.
7. There is no coordinated transportation policy in the
United States regarding the shipping industry.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Merchant Marine has been in a continual state of
decline regarding its size and the amount of tonnage carried
since World War II. To revitalize it to the forefront of world
fleets, able to support the U.S. in both peace and war, new
policies have to be instigated. Programs of massive subsidies
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have not prevented its decline. Several strategies are suggested
which might alleviate the current situation.
1. Design ships for military support missions
Build ships designed for military support purposes,
putting them directly into the National Defense Reserve Fleet
to revitalize that resource, or, as an alternative, leasing
those ships to private industry for operation in peacetime
commercial applications. The lease arrangement would include
a commitment to make them available in an emergency. Prime
consideration should be given to the multi-purpose combination
ship described and analyzed in Chapter Four. As indicated in
the analysis, its versatility is considered applicable to both
commercial and military missions.
2. Utilize In-place Incentive Programs
The Reagan Administration has proposed to eliminate
$107 million in new Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS)
money for FY 1982 [24] . In that it is in the best interest of
the Department of Defense to continue the subsidy programs to
the Maritime Industries to guarantee the existence of a sea-
lift capability in time of war, the CDS program should be
tailored to ensure that ships designed for military support
missions are built with CDS funds. Specialized commercial
designs, such as non-self sustaining containerships , would not
qualify for CDS funds.
To implement this alternative military planners must
take an active and aggressive role in the design and specifica-
tions for ship types in the early stages of development.
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3. Department of Defense (DOD) Budget for Subsidies
The Maritime Administration (MarAd) currently admin-
isters the subsidy program to the Maritime Industry. The
industry is MarAd ' s constituency. The industry in fact con-
siders MarAd as part of its own family, which in part can
account for the commercial orientation and subsequent assuage-
ment of the defense features requirements.
By reallocating the subsidy budget to DOD, defense
features for merchant ships and other programs intended to
improve sealift readiness will be greatly enhanced.
4. Congressional Legislation
Congress is currently studying programs facing the U.S.
Merchant Marine and various proposed solutions, however, they
are not ready to take the bold steps necessary to help the
merchant fleet.
Congress should take immediate steps to permit the
Defense Department to acquire ships designed for military sup-
port operations.
5. Further Study
In conclusion, the problems associated with the Mer-
chant Marine require continuing attention and study. If action
is taken courageously and quickly the means to remedy the
errors of the past can be accomplished. The strategies of the
past forty years have not served the national interest. New
technologies and innovations need to be developed and explored.
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Increased emphasis on the relationship between the Departments
of Transportation (MarAd) and the Department of Defense (Navy)
must take place. All members of the United States government
involved in this area must work together for common goals, to
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